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“managing” Europe’s others
Anya Topolski
Political Theory & Philosophy, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, Netherlands
ABSTRACT
In this contribution, I examine the Catholic political practice of “intercessions”
(shtadlanut) as a means to control and manage relations between state power
and Jewish communities by means of a privileged elite. While governmental
techniques or mechanisms of minority management are only part of a broader
question of majority–minority power relations, the theological-political roots of
such “management” strategies are often overlooked because the problem is
assumed to be secular. In my analysis of shtadlanut, I show how Jewish
communities were internally divided between “good” and “bad”, “managed” by
the ruling powers, and homogenized. It is precisely this type of enforced
collaboration with power, in combination with reduced agency and de-
politicization, that I claim goes beyond the “Jewish Question”. Rather, we must
turn our gaze on Europe and consider how, and why, it continues to make
’others’ into problems. By doing so, we can challenge the frame of the
contemporary "Muslim Question".
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 5 July 2016; Accepted 25 September 2017
KEYWORDS Shtadlanut; Islamophobia; Jews; Muslims; Arendt; Europe
Framed in terms of “managing transnational Islam”, much of the current Euro-
pean research on the “Muslim Question” espouses a comparative approach
(Haddad and Golson 2007; Laurence 2006; Loobuyck, Debeer, and Meier
2013; Meer 2012; Norton 2013; Rane and Ewart 2012). This comparative
approach emphasizes the integration of Muslims and the tolerance of the
majority. This frame scrutinizes the “minority” rather than the system itself
as well as promoting a simplistic binary between “us” and “them”. In this
frame, it is the government and its state apparatus that decides who is
Muslim, what it means to integrate, and which Muslims can/have successfully
integrated. This “top-down” application of power has a significant impact on
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the lives of Muslims. As a result, it is of the utmost importance to understand
how the state, whether national or trans-national, “manages” minorities.
With the exception of the Iberian Peninsula, Western Europe did not have a
substantial Muslim population until after 1945. This fact seemingly justifies the
limited temporal scope of much of the current literature. However, this tem-
poral restriction limits the frame of the political analysis to the modern
“secular” nation-state. Jonathan Laurence’s comparative research on the char-
acter of State–Islam relations in six European countries ranges from 1974 to
2004. He is surprised by his own findings that there is such similarity with
regard to institutional practices given such distinct state–church regimes in
Europe (2006, 261). The question Laurence – among others – does not
explore is whether these similarities might have a pre-modern (or pre-
secular) theological origin. It is my contention that the limited post-1945
focus that accentuates the different national identities of these European
states obscures the previously hegemonic theological horizon of Christianity
in Europe. It is this assumption I explore by examining the “European Ques-
tion” in terms of temporality and political-theology. Political theology analyses
the secularized, previously Christian, theological concepts that structure con-
temporary politics (e.g. sovereignty) (Schmitt 2010). Its aim is to examine and
expose how theological forms and models of power continue to operate,
often inconspicuously, in politics today. This article attempts to recover the
genealogy of one aspect of political theology in contemporary Europe,
namely the origins and regulation of the Muslim council as a political form.
I use the term genealogy rather than history to identify the intellectual
roots of a certain political tradition which does not presuppose a direct line
of continuity between European history and present. My aim is to recover
the kernel of a European political structure, in which theology played a critical
part. Specifically, it is my contention that Europe’s “minority management
system” is by no means new but has its roots in the politico-theological frame-
work of intercessions instituted by the Catholic Church.
The crux of this paper is a genealogically structured political account and
analysis of this “minority management” framework, an important component
of the historic and contemporary state surveillance apparatus. As my reason
for returning to the past is to consider what structural traces remain present
today with regard to Europe’s “new” “Semitic” others, this paper focuses on
the similarities – a focus which of course comes at the cost of studying differ-
ences. While some of these differenceswill bementioned in the conclusion, the
purpose of this paper is not to discount the substantial differences between
Europe’s “others”, but to recover some critical commonalities that have been
missed in the literature. The inclusion of Islamic groups in European political
institutions, in particular those that communicate with governmental insti-
tutions, is arranged in a manner analogous to the earlier “inclusion” of other
“religious” minorities. It is my contention that this method is similar to that
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previously used tomanage the Jewishminority (and to a lesser extent to that of
other “minority” religions). Quite problematically, the “white-washed” history
of the inclusion of Jews in Europe, as evidenced by the problematic reference
to Europe’s “Judeo-Christian” tradition (Topolski 2016), is used to silence
Muslims who voice their dissent regarding the state’s “management of
Islam”. No mention is made of the role the Shoah, and specifically Europe’s
responsibility or shame, had in this “integration” process. By turning the gaze
towards Europe, I am not suggesting that neither Jews nor Muslims do not
have agency in this process – but rather to analyse how this agency is often
reduced by the state. My aim is to highlight Europe’s often hidden responsibil-
ity and role in the structural process of othering. Nonetheless, both groups do
continue to play an important role, whether by challenging this process or by
internalizing it, and, as such both are partially responsible for the structural
relations between the state and their respective groups.
In this contribution, I turnmy gaze to “the EuropeanQuestion” (Anidjar 2012)
by investigating one particular “minority management” practice. This interces-
sory practice, known in Yiddish as shtadlanut, was imposed upon Jewish com-
munities in Europe in order to govern them since the Middle Ages (taking
different forms over time). Thismanagement practice, and its informal institutio-
nalization in Europe, is conceptually well charted, was not only part of Europe’s
internal legacy as many Jewish minority management practices were imposed
across the globe by means of colonialism (Mufti 2007). By describing the theo-
logical structure of intercessions that led to the practice of shtadlanut, I analyse
how Jewish communities were “accommodated”, internally divided between
“good” and “bad” Jews, and “managed” or institutionalized by the ruling
powers. While this political-theological structure is no longer overtly in place,
it is my contention that the structural mechanism of exclusion it produced
reappears in an adapted form today in the form of top-down managed
Muslim councils in many European nation-states. After providing an account
of this practice, I focus on the power dynamics of this practice (noting of
course that it was by no means homogeneous). In structural terms, shtadlanut
is a process that forces a heterogeneous population into a controlled vertical
homogenized power structure thereby encouraging internal conflict. An adap-
tation of the Roman divide et impera, this political-theological structure depoli-
ticizes and fragments marginalized groups, prevents resistance and struggle,
and regulates subjectivity by limiting agency. By way of conclusion, I return to
the context of Europe today to consider how the traces of this structure and
practice function in relation to Europe’s “Muslim Question”.
An account of shtadlanut
Arendt’s account of shtadlanut arises in the context of her analysis of antise-
mitism. As such, it is essential to address her highly controversial claim that
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antisemitism’s “source must be found in certain aspects of Jewish history and
specifically Jewish functions during the last centuries” (1973, 9). Without
denying the reality of centuries of persecution, oppression, and exclusion of
Jews, Arendt refuses to deny Jewish agency; Jews, albeit with reduced
options and agency, were still actors – they had the possibility of making
choices about how to act/react. It is for this reason that she criticizes scape-
goat theories, which deny Jews, as individuals and as a collective, possessing
political agency as well as the view that antisemitism is “natural”. This highly
controversial position, often inaccurately described as “blaming the victims”, is
rooted in her concept of the political, which is based on the importance of
relationality and shared responsibility for the world (Topolski 2015). Arendt
is not blaming Jews. The language of blame fails to understand her political
concern which is to understand and demonstrate how inter-related, and as
such, inter-responsible we all are for politics. To deny that Jews played a
role would be, in her view, to further deny their agency and humanity and,
as such, further feed antisemitism.
Paradoxically, what enabled these asymmetrical power relations (e.g. anti-
semitism, imperialism, totalitarianism) – the need for human interaction – also
inspires people to act politically. Her claim is that by way of violence and
oppression, antisemitism and colonialism create bonds between people
that bring order to a world all too often experienced as chaotic and meaning-
less. While the exploiter may set the stage, and limit the possibilities of the
exploited, the exploited nonetheless has a “forced” choice to internalize this
role, or refuse it.
Only wealth without power or aloofness without a policy are felt to be parasitic,
useless, revolting, because such conditions cut all the threads which tie men
together. Wealth which does not exploit lacks even the relationship which
exists between exploiter and exploited. (Arendt 1973, 5)
That Jews were perceived as parasitic because they seemed to avoid interact-
ing with broader society brings us to her analysis of shtadlanut. By turning to
historical and theological sources, we can examine how this (miss)perception
arose.
From Roman times onwards, with very few exceptions, Jewish commu-
nities under Christian rule viewed changes in the dominant society with
uncertainty and fear (Nirenberg 2013). For the vast majority of Jews, who
had little interactions with those outside of their community, political
change had the potential to lead to violence, increased poverty, forced relo-
cations, and fatalities. Yet this political realm, which many Jews equated with
persecution rather than emancipation, could not be completed avoided, as it
was necessary to have input with regard to affairs that would affect their own
community. The theological structure that was politically imported to permit
such communication was that of intercessions. According to Catholic practice,
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to intercede is to go or come between parties, to plead before one of them on
behalf of the other… in ecclesiastical usage [intercessions] are taken in the
sense of the intervention primarily of Christ, and secondly of the Blessed
Virgin and the angels and saints, on behalf of men.1
This theological structure of intercessions was the model used to permit select
Jewish men, as well as other non-Christians, to communicate with those who
ruled over them. After (most often) having paid a stipulated ﬁnancial sum, a
Jew – acting as spokesman for his community – was permitted to approach
the authorities, to prostrate himself (as Christians did before the alter in
their personal intercessions), and beg (pray for Christians) for them to inter-
cede in a particular affair of importance to the Jewish community.
An interesting political question, explored at length by Arendt in her essay
“Privileged Jews”, is which Jews could intercede and on whose behalf – the
question of representation, a question that is as topical today. Not surpris-
ingly, most Jews shied away from such direct contact with authority
(Guesnet 2007, 232). For both pragmatic and existential reasons that the
vast majority of Jews were more than happy not to have to take up this inter-
cessory role. While this clearly undermined their own ability to develop politi-
cal agency or horizontal solidarity, it seemed a safer option for those whose
lives were already defined by precarity. Nonetheless, it was important for
some Jews to intercede, to speak in the name of the larger community, as
this was the only means permitted by the authority. The shtadlan, a
member of the elite, was selected by the Jewish community to maintain
contact with the authority, as a means to exert influence from below
(without actually engaging in political action) in a practice known as shtadla-
nut ( השתדלות/שתדלנות ). Lobbying, as epitomized by organizations such as
AIPAC, is the secular translation of this term.
As historian François Guesnet has observed, forms of shtadlanut existed
since the beginnings of the Diaspora. And for centuries, the story of Esther,
re-enacted each year on the festival of Purim, “served as a master narrative
to those acting on behalf of a Jewish community in a Gentile environment”
(2005, 355). In the story, Mordechai, Esther’s uncle, explicitly and repeatedly
tells her not to reveal that she is Jewish, and to act as a parvenu (to assimilate
at all costs), so that she can prevent harm to the Jewish community by literally
prostituting herself (the latter of course opens a whole string of gender issues
we must set aside here) (Esther 2:10). Esther thus consciously denies her
Jewish identity, avoiding the public realm and choosing rather to lobby in
the private realm, in order to be able to intercede on behalf of her people.
The practice of shtadlanut was a common one from the Middle Ages until
modernity when there were even “professional” shtadlans who interceded
on behalf of several different Jewish communities. With roots laid down in
feudal times, when Jews often governed their own internal affairs but had
to comply with whatever rules and demands imposed by the non-Jewish
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authorities, the shtadlan had an important role in terms of communication.
The practice of shtadlanut called for intercessions with regard to taxation,
accusations of blood libel, and other accusations of religious transgressions
– problems that affected the entire Jewish community (Guesnet 2005, 2007).
Whereas in medieval times the Jews, with the approval of the external
authorities, often appointed the shtadlan, this changed drastically by the
seventeenth century. From this time onwards, the shtadlan was designated
by the authority, most often without consultation from the Jewish community
he “represented”. This change is a fundamental one with regard to the gov-
ernance practice of minorities. By the time of absolute monarch, the choice
of shtadlan was made not in the best interests of his community but based
on criteria determined by the authorities such as his linguistic skills, social
adeptness, politics (or lack thereof), and his economic assets. The main
reason for the latter was that the shtadlan, and his international network,
were required to raise funds for the sovereign. This change further added
to the precarity of the Jewish community, for if the shtadlan failed to keep
the favour of the monarch, the Jewish communities were often denied all
rights and/or residency.
The shift to a shadtlan chosen by the state also affected how the shtadlan
was perceived by the Jewish community he “represented”. By the eighteenth
century, the prominent or “court Jew” served the prince or lord in exchange
for privileges and special protection. Yet these privileges/protection slowly
became more and more limited to individuals (most often extending to
immediate family), which led to the shtadlan being viewed by the wider
Jewish community as “a tool of the government” who only sporadically
acted in their best interest. This led to a significant division within the
Jewish community between on the one hand, the educated “enlightened”
and economically independent Jews (who were often permitted to reside
within the walled city centres), and the majority of Jews who were financially
limited and who lived outside the city proper. Over time, shtadlans were
assigned symbolic roles as dignitaries and functionaries in legislative or repre-
sentative bodies and thus became more influential in the non-Jewish commu-
nity than among Jews. In the end, two Jewish communities existed that slowly
grew apart from each other and failed to see themselves as politically
connected.
There were different historical forms of shtadlanut in Europe, from the
medieval period to modern times, each of which produced different types
of shtadlans (or privileged Jews). These were the “court Jews”, “the pro-
tected/useful Jews”, the Schutzjude, the Rothchild family, etc., all of whom
(to different degrees) developed close relations with the ruling authorities.
Most of these relations were also economic in nature. By the end of the eight-
eenth century, certain wealthy Jews were able to find a place for themselves
as the first financiers of the new states. This lasted until the new nation-states
6 A. TOPOLSKI
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were so large that no single shtadlan could finance it, which led to the first
trans-national financiers. Arendt’s understanding of the specifics of these
developments is too simplistic, as Guesnet’s analysis makes clear (2005).
Nonetheless, her insights into the overall mechanism of intercession are com-
pelling. One example she highlights was the Rothschild families, whom she
claims allied themselves with authority as such, never limiting their relations
to a particular government or political position. They were willing to switch
allegiances overnight, expressed by means of financial support, as power
shifted (Arendt 1973, 25). While this certainly offered certain Jews, whose
families had prominent shtadlans as members, state protection and special
privileges, this only applied to a limited number of highly visible Jews who
symbolically became the “financial arm” of the sovereign, but who were
often seen as disloyal to the state by nationalists, as they were willing to
work across national lines. Anna Zuk analyses this phenomenon in the eight-
eenth-century Poland in terms of the Jews being misperceived, and stigma-
tized, as “a mobile class” based on the economic-based mobility of a few
select Jews (Zuk 1993).
By the end of the long nineteenth century, this relationship slowly began to
crumble as imperialism offered a new source of capital. This turn beyond the
borders of Europe, which occurred in combination with the decline of the
Church and thus its prohibition on money-lending, led many Christians to
recognize the riches that colonial adventures offered and to take over the
Jewish financial niche. It was only when this particular group of wealthy
and highly educated Jews were no longer of instrumental use to the state
that they realized their own lack of power. This powerlessness was further
amplified by the fact that the vast majority of Jews did not know how to
act politically (with notable exceptions such as the Yiddish socialist Bund
and certain Zionist groups), as centuries of shtadlanut had led them naively
to believe that this type of intercession was the sum of all politics. Further-
more, the perception in non-Jewish society that most Jews failed to express
a political position led to the association of all Jews (even though only
certain privileged Jews were publically known) with the nation-state, an
association which was at the basis of modern antisemitism (approximately
1870s). This is one aspect of the depoliticizing aspect of the practice of shta-
dlanut, a devious form of minority management.
The other aspect of Arendt’s thesis is the internalization of this powerless-
ness, a form of normalization, which leads subjects to deny their political
agency, as subjects of power rather than helpless objects at the mercy of
the authorities. She develops the distinction between political agency and
powerlessness in terms of conscious pariahs and social parvenus (Arendt
1968, 1973, 1978). The pariah is a “bold spirit who tried to make the emanci-
pation of Jews as Jews to the ranks of humanity, rather than a permit to ape
the gentiles or an opportunity to play the parvenu” (Arendt 1978, 68). The
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latter are those who have accepted the role forced upon them by the model
of shtadlanut, during “modern Jewish history, having started with court Jews
and continuing with Jewish millionaires and philanthropists” (Arendt 1978,
65). By contrast, the conscious pariah is the minority of Jews who refused
to assimilate, allowing themselves to become objects to be controlled by
the ruling powers, and who chose the only alternative which was exile –
both from their own people and from the authorities.
Writing both as a phenomenologist and based on personal experience, the
majority of Jews during the interbellum period acted as parvenus and
accepted their powerlessness (Arendt 1973, 20–25). The fate of the Jews,
which they accepted until it was too late to fight, assisted by rampant antise-
mitic political rhetoric (left and right), was sealed by the growing discontent
with the state – across Europe – developing in the late nineteenth century,
which slowly began to erode at nationalism, to which the Jews were tied
by the masses, a link fully exploited by the Nazis. This claim is further evidence
that while “Arendt never lost sight of the disabling conditions imposed by the
history of anti-Semitism that made it impossible for Jews to participate as
human beings in the political life of modern Europe” (Spanos 2012, 149),
she refused to treat Jews and Jewish communities as objects who were not
agents of their own (tragic) stories. What Arendt describes in terms of shtadla-
nut should, therefore, be understood as a theologically inspired political and
structural mechanism of depoliticization and subjugation that seeks to deny
agency and the possibility of resistance to the other. While she limits her
analysis to the management of Jews, it is essential to consider the broader
implications of this theological-political practice.
From shtadlanut to Jewish councils
This account of shtadlanut allows us to understand the political aspects of this
minority management practice, how it changed over time, as well as its inter-
twinement with political economy. I now wish to connect this analysis to the
creation of the Judenrat in the twentieth century. It is noteworthy that while
there is a prominent Islamrat in Germany today (www.islamrat.de), the parallel
organization for Jews in Germany is named Zentral Rat der Juden (www.
zentralratdjuden.de) . My aim in making this link is to consider a particular
twentieth-century manifestation of a “secularized” and institutionalized
form of shtadlanut. As Schreiber has observed, “For centuries, Jewish commu-
nities throughout Europe were self-governed by a council known in Hebrew
as kahal or kehillah, and so the introduction of the Judenrat, seems to flow
naturally from this historical continuum” (2015, 91). The shtadlan was gener-
ally the leader of the kahal. While the practice of shtadlanut during the nine-
teenth century was justified in the name of emancipation (a euphemism for
assimilation) in the twentieth century, it eventually led to “a justificatory
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discursive regime that paradoxically rendered the collaboration of the Jewish
leadership with antisemitism indispensable, first with the European powers
and later with Nazi Germany” (Spanos 2012, 182). It is precisely this type of
enforced collaboration with power in combination with reduced agency,
powerlessness, and depoliticization that I claim goes beyond the “Jewish
Question” and should be understood as central to the “European Question”.
Less than a month after the start of World War II (WWII), Heydrich issues a
letter stipulating the formation of the Judenrat in all occupied territories. The
Nazis party leadership explicitly chose to use this “management” strategy as it
was taken to be an integral structural component in the daily controlling of
the ghettos which also required the least “cost” in terms of Nazis/Gestapo
manpower (Hilberg 2003, 125). “Composed of twenty-four male Jews, prefer-
ably influential personalities and rabbis, its duties were prescribed as 1)
executing German [Nazis] orders, 2) taking an improvised census of the
Jews in their areas, 3) evacuating the Jews from rural to urban locations… ”
(Klein 1960, 27).
This is the same criteria previously used to appoint shtadlans. Once the
plans for the “Final Solution”were fixed, the Judenrat was also required to reg-
ister all valuable property (which was a significant source of income for the
Nazis) and most unsettling – selecting those who would board the next
train to the camps. The Jewish council members, thus, had to decide who
would live and who would die.
To a Jew this role of the Jewish leaders in the destruction of their own people is
undoubtedly the darkest chapter of the whole dark story… In Amsterdam as in
Warsaw, in Berlin as in Budapest, Jewish officials could be trusted to compile the
lists of persons and of their property, to secure money from the deportees to
defray the expenses of their deportation and extermination, to keep track of
vacated apartments, to supply police forces to help seize Jews and get them
on trains. (Arendt 2010, 117–118)
While shtadlans were often rewarded with privileges, such as extra rights and
recognition, members of the Judenrat had much more limited power and
authority and their daily existence was a precarious one; their lives, as well
as those they loved, were on the line. Most often, they did not choose their
roles, as was the case with shtadlans after the eighteenth century. Nonethe-
less, most believed – like shtadlans – that they were acting in the best interest
of the larger Jewish community by assisting the Nazis in managing the
ghettos and organizing the deportations (Trunk 1972, xvii). This not surpris-
ingly led to a great deal of internal strife and discontent within the Jewish
community. Hilberg’s analysis shows how the Nazis used the Judenrat to regu-
late what was previously a heterogeneous population of European Jews by
way of terror, thereby encouraging internal conﬂict and further depoliticiza-
tion (Hilberg 2003). While there were courageous exceptions, such as Adam
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Czerniakow (Warsaw) who chose to commit suicide rather than send another
of his fellow Jews to death, following Socrates’ ethical code that it is better to
die than to kill, there were also council members like Chaim I (Lodz) who
created a ghetto currency and stamps with his picture on it to reafﬁrm his
power. At the Nuremberg trials, several members of the Sonderkommandos
stated they “had committed criminal acts in order to save themselves from
the danger of immediate death”, and drew an analogy to the Jewish Councils
who stated that they “cooperated because they thought they could avert con-
sequences more serious than those which resulted” (Arendt 2010, 91). This
does not imply that either were collaborators. Many “cooperated” because
they thought it would buy time or avoid worse violence – which at certain
points was effective. Though it cannot be denied that death loomed over
every Jew during the Shoah, and every decision was one of life and death,
Eichmann repeatedly remarked during his trial how surprised he was by the
willingness of the Jewish Councils to cooperate and even streamline the
process, in the hope that such enthusiasm would be rewarded by privileges
or protection.
There can be no doubt, without the cooperation of the victims, it would hardly
have been possible for a few thousand people, most of whom, moreover worked
in offices, to liquidate many hundreds of thousands of other people… (Arendt
2010, 117)
Based on the research done by Hilberg, Arendt concludes that councils that
cooperated with the Nazis occasioned much higher deportation and extermi-
nation rates than in ghettos and cities where they refused to do so or were
simply less organized. While her numbers and facts have been questioned
and challenged for the past ﬁfty years, her tragic thesis has yet to be invali-
dated (Bauer 2002; Hilberg 2003; Klein 1960; Trunk 1972). A parvenu, willing
to cooperate, aided no one. The pariahs who resisted, those who refused to
assimilate, were more likely to save lives and almost as important, to retain
their self-respect. The latter is worth dwelling on. As scholars who reject
Arendt’s conclusion, such as Yehuda Bauer, conclude – Jews were doomed
no matter how they acted. Yet, if this was the case, didn’t resistance and main-
taining one’s self-respect make a meaningful difference? Other scholars, such
as Trunk, who support a modiﬁed version of Arendt’s conclusions, nonetheless
stress the fact that we cannot judge. Without using the moral language of
blame, which is inappropriate here, it is essential we learn to judge political
choices and actions (and not people themselves); to fail to do so leads to
further powerlessness and depoliticization.
What the analysis above of the Judenratmakes clear is that many European
Jews internalized and justified this imposed representative structure, playing a
role in their own depoliticization. This further divided Jews into pariahs and
parvenus, exiling the former, and destroying the possibility of horizontal
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bonds,2 at times preventing resistance and empowerment – making real their
sense of an absence of power. Such practices end in catch-22s. If one con-
forms to the expectations of authority, a parvenu or “good Jew”, reinforces
the fact that being Jewish is unacceptable. If one refuses to be a parvenu,
you are a “bad-Jew” or pariah, politically or socially exiled to loneliness. In
either case, a potentially powerful community is internally divided, depoliti-
cized and fragmented. This type of schism led to tragedy for the Jewish com-
munity in the years prior to the Shoah. The “good” assimilated, rich and
educated Western Jews saw themselves as disconnected from the fate of
the “uncivilised irrational and poor” East European Jews, as is clear from
their failure to respond when so many were illegally deported a week
before Kristallnacht. It was only after they themselves became victims of
such illegality that the “good” Jews began to realize that their internalization
of these divisions was politically destructive.
While Arendt was branded an antisemite and a self-hating Jew, her analysis
was not meant to blame or attack the Jews but to understand the political
mechanisms of power in a totalitarian regime. The importance of the story
of the Judenrat is to show how exclusionary, controlling, and depoliticizing
structures can lead to practices that – especially when internalized – can
have devastating effects. This fact, when put into the historical context of
the theological-political practice of shtadlanut, understood in terms of a struc-
tural mechanism of power, sheds light on similar mechanisms used to com-
municate and control other minority religious communities. Many of its
features, such as its disempowering and depoliticizing effects, are part and
parcel of most majority–minority political struggles (Mufti 2007).
The “Muslim question”, or better yet, the “European question”?
Until now, I have considered how shtadlanut was transformed into a depoliti-
cizing minority management practice with regard to the Jewish community in
Europe. However, as my intention is to turn the gaze away from the victims –
neither of whom are to be blamed – towards the system of oppression, which
should bear the brunt of responsibility. It is now essential to demonstrate how
this practice goes beyond the “Jewish Question”. In this vein, Said’s reference
to the shared roots of European discrimination provides the broader frame-
work for this exploration (Said 1979, xviii). Although Said does not identify
this common root as arising from Europe’s political-theology, he does
describe several parallels between the “management” of these two minority
communities. In addition, his work reminds us of the shared frame used by
Europeans to “other” both Jews and Muslims. “Orientalism was ultimately a
political vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference between
the familiar (Europe, the West, ‘us’) and the strange (Orient, the East,
‘them’)”, (Said 1979, 43). While until this century Jews were framed as the
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internal other and Muslims the external other, the Shoah and post-WWII
migration have changed this reality.3 Moreover, with the assistance of
framing, a political strategy that cannot be underestimated in the twenty-
first century when the media has come to define reality, it is possible to accel-
erate a mechanism that previously might have taken centuries to institutiona-
lize itself. The continued presence of this orientalist frame is evident today.
The Orientalist discourse… dominates current representations of Islam, which
are reductive and predominantly negative.…Muslims are homogenized as back-
ward, irrational, unchanging, fundamentalist, misogynist, threatening, manipula-
tive in the use of their faith for politics and personal gain. (Lacey 2014, 96)
A dominant prejudice against Muslims in Europe is that there is a bond
between “all Muslims” (Kundnani 2014). When someone, labelled by the
media as a Muslim, commits a misdemeanour – it is seen as seems normal
to turn to the nearest mosque and ask the “representative” to denounce
the perpetrator. All differences – linguistic, ethnic, religious, and gender – dis-
appear to be replaced by prejudicial perceptions much like the false hom-
ogenizing perceptions of Jews created by the practice of shtadlanut. This
tendency to homogenize and reduce the other is, according to Said, part
and parcel of the common roots of antisemitism and orientalism, and more
specifically the many forms of Islamophobia that are to be seen across
Europe and in the media. Likewise Said, influenced by both Arendt and Fou-
cault, notes how Muslims have internalized this frame, an internalization
which is normalized and further leads to internal divisions and depoliticization
(Said 1979). This homogenization is thus part of the discursive association of
Jews and Muslims/Arabs in the European social imaginary, an association that
is implicitly propagated by such management practices as shtadlanut.
Many contemporary scholars of Islam in Europe have begun to investigate
a new rhetoric of “good” and “bad” Muslims (Hajjat 2010; Mamdani 2002) as
well as tighter control and regulation of Muslim Councils (Amir-Moazami 2011;
Kundnani 2014). What is clear from our analysis of the practice of shtadlanut is
how these two effects are related. Much like the discussions in the past about
Jews having divided loyalties, Muslims in Europe are being essentialized as “a
single block and homogeneous entity” (Ajala 2014, 131) who are equally
divided in their loyalties. According to Lacey, “the orientalist discourse has
been further adapted, particularly since 9/11, where both politicians and aca-
demics introduce provisos into their discourse, creating a dichotomy between
‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims” (Lacey 2014, 97). The former are “moderate”
Muslims who like Arendt’s parvenus wish to be “accepted”; the latter are
the “fundamentalists”, “radicals” or “terrorists” because they refuse to
conform to the demands of authority. These good Muslims, like the good
Jews of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, are “integrated” or “assimi-
lated” individuals, secularized liberals who have “become” law-abiding
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Muslims (not law-abiding citizens). The “bad Muslims” cannot be trusted, are
all potential terrorists and disloyal to the state. Most recently with the rise of
ISIS and the terror attacks, all Sunnis have been unjustly framed as “bad”
Muslims and are under suspicion solely because of their origins.
The second noted change concerns the creation and regulation of Muslim
councils both at the national and trans-national level. As this article has demon-
strated, there is a shared genealogy between present Muslim councils and
those, both past and present, used to manage Jewish minorities in European
nation-states. As each nation has its own particular history and position on
state–church relations, there are undoubtedly many differences. One impor-
tant difference is the fact that Jews were often, though not always, stateless
minorities. By contrast, Muslims in Europe today are not stateless (some even
have dual citizenship). Likewise, with the birth of the EU, the trans-national
aspect also requires further analysis (Bunzl 2007). Nonetheless, there is still a
parallel worth considering on both levels as Jews were also seen as loyal to
their trans-national religious brethren and not to their state. “The creation of
Islam Councils reflects [the] governments desire to mold Islam into an organi-
zationally homologous shape” (Laurence 2006, 257). This demand is by no
means a new one and was made repeatedly in the late nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries by governments on the Jewish communities.
The past few years have seen an unprecedented flurry of state-sanctioned incor-
poration of Muslim councils, high-profile consultations with Muslim representa-
tives, exclusive patronage of “moderate” Muslim groups in Western Europe.
Throughout… the final stamp of approval, however, continues to lie with the
state. (Haddad and Golson 2007, 499–500)
Without any pretence of being exhaustive or scientific, let us consider some
of the parallels between the practice of shtadlanut and the proliferation of
Muslim councils and other such representative institutions in different Euro-
pean nation-states. While prior to the 1960s there were many overlapping
and disconnected organizations ranging from Turkish guest workers associ-
ations to house-mosques, most were free of government intervention. This
changed first in the 1970s, and in a much more restrictive manner in the
post 9/11 period (Kundnani 2014). The government has taken on a “more
proactive strategy: the repositioning of the state as arbiter and chief architect
of a ‘moderate’ European Islam” (Haddad and Golson 2007, 488). What were
once primarily horizontal social and cultural organizations is now being regu-
lated through a religious prism in which members are required to register
(which itself raises many red flags) in order to create top-down umbrella
organizations that can speak directly to the government as representative
of all Muslims. There is also a growing intolerance communicated by means
of repeated criticisms of Islam’s un-hierarchical organization – often cited as
evidence of the fundamental inability of Muslims to integrate (Rémond
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1999; Warner and Wenner 2006). The top-down demand for one Muslim voice
has also led to increased tensions and schisms within a very diverse Muslim
community. And as was the case for the Jews of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, this has led to the construction of two kinds of Jews: modern vs.
inassimilable or in today’s terms “good” and “bad Muslims”, the former of
course being docile political subjects.
Europe domesticated Judaism and Christianity to the point where these faith
communities became integral to the civic fabric of the secular state. Their dom-
estication, however, took place long ago… government officials seemed con-
vinced that a moderate Islam of Europe will be created with or without the
total cooperation of the continent’s Muslims. (Haddad and Golson 2007, 514–515)
Furthermore, the rising tension and struggle for a voice on these represen-
tative councils, which often have the power to allocate spaces, funds and other
privileges also plays into the orientalist frame of Muslims (or Arabs) as primitive,
tribal, and aggressive. A similar frame was imposed on Jews especially in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – as prone to irrational, undemo-
cratic, violent, and pro-anarchy – a frame that has in the post-Shoah era been
completely sanitized. These internal power struggles for resources and recog-
nition have also made the possibility of collective action and alliances between
different Muslim constituencies much more difficult leading to a general depo-
liticization and relegation to the private realm.4 Much like the powerlessness
internalized by Jews in the period up until the twentieth century, it is clear that:
It does not help that the fledging Muslim councils have had little to show for
their high profile state patronage… not able to overturn ban on hijabs, push
blasphemy laws to protect Islam… kosher… circumcisions… (Haddad and
Golson 2007, 513)
These struggles have also led to a very turbulent history with regard to the
success of these Muslims councils, many of which have had to be disbanded –
more than once – or had to have been re-organized etc. The most well-known
cases of this are with regard to the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM) in
which there was a bottom-up reaction to government interventionwith regard
to the selection of “personnalities qualifiées”, leading to the CFCM being
defined as a “puppet of the government” (Loobuyck, Debeer, and Meier
2013). What also makes the French case special is that it has been fully trans-
lated into the laic rhetoric of councils for cultural (and not religious) organiz-
ations. Likewise in Germany, what is clear though is that “minorities” are still
expected to conform to the demands of the governments in order to be recog-
nized. “With its top-down approach to Muslims as mere re-actors the DIK
[Deutsche IslamKonferenz] has so far turnedout to bemuchmore a governmen-
tal technique which aims at reshaping Muslims according to liberal/secular
norms” (Amir-Moazami 2011, 2). Moreover, the DIK has been required to
disband in order to “de-radicalize”. “The effectiveness of the DIK, which was
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plagued by deep quarrels, vague results and limited time spent on the pro-
blems of racism and Islamophobia, was also criticized” (Loobuyck, Debeer,
and Meier 2013, 63). Considering how distinct the UK is from Europe in terms
of its history, geography and politics, it is disturbing that it too began to estab-
lish such councils in order to promote the “good” type of Islam. Many of these
councils were state supported until 2001 when their leaders choose to join the
“stop thewarmovement” and in thismanner expressed criticism of the govern-
ment, a political position shtadlans are not permitted.Muslim “citizens” are only
“good” if they are depoliticized docile subject. While non-Muslims citizens are
being told to engage in politics, the exact opposite is one of the aims of the
Prevent Agenda. While each national context has its particularities, the simi-
larities eclipse these national differences.
In these cases, and many more across Europe, groups or individuals that act
publically and/or politically are accused of being fanatics politicizing Islam – a
catch-22 that was common to Jews, such as Zionist organizations. These same
“public”Muslims are accused of being disloyal to the state and are often under
surveillance, excluded form membership in these councils and the target of
other forms of discrimination (Kundnani 2014). A more recent phenomenon,
also described by Guesnet’s research, is the trend of avoiding selecting repre-
sentatives for these Muslims councils who speak for larger communities pre-
ferring a more individualized council formed of business persons, “model
liberal Muslims”, well-known figures, etc.
Conclusions
While the governmental techniques or mechanisms of minority management
are only part of a broader question – whether a Jewish or Muslim question –
an aspect of this inquiry that has often been overlooked, because of the tem-
poral assumption that its roots are secular, are the theological-political roots of
such “management” strategies. By turning the gaze from Europe’s others to
Europe itself, I have sought to identify one possible political-theological struc-
ture, that of intercessions, which manifests itself politically –with regard to the
Jewish community – in terms of the practice of shtadlanut. In my analysis of
this practice, I show how Jewish communities were “accommodated”, intern-
ally divided between “good” and “bad” Jews; and “managed” or institutiona-
lized by the ruling powers. I then consider shtadlanut in structural terms a
process that forces a heterogeneous population into a controlled vertical
homogenized power structure thereby encouraging internal conflict. It is pre-
cisely this type of enforced collaboration with power in combination with
reduced agency and depoliticization that I claim goes beyond the “Jewish
Question” and should be understood as central to the “European Question”,
a question which has now been framed in terms of the “Muslim question”,
a frame that must be critically examined.
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While detailed sociological investigations would be necessary to properly
establish the claim that Muslims in Europe today are being “managed” by
means of the secularized structure of intercessions that was previously used
to control Jewish communities, I hope to have shown that there are
enough parallels to consider engaging in such an inquiry. Perhaps Laurence,
in his quest to understand the structural similarity of different national
regimes of Muslim “integration”, throws the baby out with the bathwater.
While “the state’s challenge has been to establish these nascent councils as
legitimate interlocutors for public authorities” it does not “stem from a
desire to impose a Catholic-style hierarchy on Islam” (Laurence 2006, 256–
257). While the state may not “desire” to impose this type of hierarchy, it
might nonetheless be doing so by dangling the false illusion of inclusion
over these communities as it once had for other “religious” minorities. Laur-
ence implicitly acknowledges this when he writes, “after all, Protestants and
Jews do not naturally gravitate towards centralized representation either,
but they were required to reorganize to obtain full legal recognition” (Laur-
ence 2006, 257). Jews, it is worth recalling never obtained “full legal recog-
nition”. This legal and political struggle was only partially achieved prior to
the Shoah and the number of Jews in Europe after the Shoah makes this
“full legal recognition” an ethical question rather than a political one. As is
clear from the analysis of the Judenrat, it is my contention that a similar “man-
agement strategy” continues to exert its presence under the cloak of secular-
ism. As Asad reminds us: “the concept of minority arises from a specific
Christian history: from the dissolution of the bond that was formed immedi-
ately after the Reformation between the established Church and the early
modern state” (as qtd in Pagden 2002, 222). In this manner, I hope to have
demonstrated how a particular practice of secular “minority management”
was born under the hierarchical shadow of Catholic theology.
Notes
1. Catholic Encyclopedia: http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08070a.htm.
2. This internal competition between Jews is something Guesnet analyses closely,
see Textures, page 363.
3. While beyond the confines of this paper, see Gil Anidjar’s thesis on this parallel in
which Jews were the theological other and Muslims the political.
4. The same applies to the tiny Jewish communities in countries such as Belgium –
although these internal power struggles are not scrutinized and condemned by
the media and public because of Europe’s post-Shoah guilt.
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